Given the preferential tax treatment afforded nonprofit firms, policymakers and researchers have been interested in whether the nonprofit sector provides higher nursing home quality relative to its for-profit counterpart. However, differential selection into for-profits and nonprofits can lead to biased estimates of the effect of ownership form. By using "differential distance" to the nearest nonprofit nursing home relative to the nearest for-profit nursing home, we mimic randomization of residents into more or less "exposure" to nonprofit homes when estimating the effects of ownership on quality of care. Using national Minimum Data Set assessments linked with Medicare claims, we use a national cohort of post-acute patients who were newly admitted to nursing homes within an 18-month period spanning January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2005. After instrumenting for profit status, we found that post-acute patients in nonprofit facilities had fewer 30-day hospitalizations and greater improvement in pain and ADL functioning.
Introduction
Two defining features of the nursing home market are the high number of for-profit facilities and the perception of low quality care in many facilities. The nursing home sector is roughly two-thirds for-profit, while the hospital sector, by comparison, is approximately twothirds non-profit. Quality of care has been a longstanding concern in the nursing home sector with policymakers, researchers, media and the public all identifying low quality care (Institute of Medicine 1986; U.S. Government Accounting Office 1998). Policymakers and researchers alike have been interested in linking these two ideas by suggesting a causal relationship between ownership status and quality of care.
A large literature examines this issue, but the vast majority of the existing studies comparing for-profit and nonprofit quality have not accounted for differential selection into forprofits and nonprofits, which may bias estimates of the effect of ownership form. The type of consumer who chooses a nonprofit facility may be quite different in many unobserved ways from the consumer who selects a for-profit facility. If so, simple comparisons of quality in for-profits and nonprofits, controlling for observable characteristics, may yield misleading estimates.
Moreover, the vast majority of studies examining ownership and quality have not focused on the short-stay (post-acute) nursing home population.
When randomization is not feasible, as in this case, instrumental variables estimation can be used to account for unobserved differences across study populations. One "instrument" that has been frequently and successfully used in health care is the differential distance from the patient's home to different providers. By using "differential distance" to the nearest nonprofit nursing home relative to the nearest for-profit nursing home, we mimic randomization of residents into more or less "exposure" to nonprofit homes when estimating the effects of ownership on quality of care for the post-acute nursing home population.
Using national Minimum Data Set assessments linked with Medicare claims, we use a national cohort of residents who were newly admitted to nursing homes within an 18-month period spanning January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2005 . We use instrumental variables analysis to examine the effect of ownership on risk-adjusted, person-level short-stay measures of quality.
After instrumenting for ownership status, we found that post-acute quality of care was generally poorer in for-profit quality facilities. Specifically, post-acute patients in nonprofit facilities were less likely to be hospitalized within 30 days and more likely to experience improvement in pain status and ADL functioning.
Conceptual Framework

Background
The most recent National Nursing Home Survey counted 1. to age 65 will use a nursing home at some point in their lives (Spillman, and Lubitz 2002) .
Nursing home expenditures totaled $115.2 billion in 2004, which represented 6.1 percent of national health expenditures (Smith et al. 2006) . The nursing home market consists of both chronic (long-stay) and post-acute (short-stay) residents. Medicaid is the dominant payer of chronic nursing home services, accounting for roughly 50% of all nursing home expenditures and 70% of all bed days. Medicare covers post-acute nursing home care, which accounts for 12% of total nursing home expenditures. The remainder of care is financed primarily by private outof-pocket payments.
For-profit nursing homes, constituting roughly two-thirds of all facilities, may be owned by an individual, partnership or corporation. Nonprofits make up approximately one-fourth of all facilities and are predominantly church-related or a nonprofit corporation. The remaining nursing homes (6%) are government-owned and may be run by the state, county, city, hospital district or federal government, any of which might contract for management services from proprietary firms.
Nursing Home Objectives
For-profit nursing homes are presumed to maximize profits by setting output, quality, inputs and patient mix at levels to achieve this objective. In most industries, profit-maximizing behavior, given a reasonable level of competition, would be expected to yield desirable outcomes, defined as the delivery of the array and quality of services most valued by consumers given the costs of efficient production. However, if nursing home residents (and prospective residents) cannot readily ascertain the level of quality provided by different nursing homes, the profit motive can lead to lower quality than would be chosen by a hypothetical, fully-informed resident. Unlike their for-profit counterparts, nonprofits cannot distribute accounting profits to individual equity holders. In return, nonprofits enjoy several government-conferred advantages, including exemption from corporate income and property taxes and a lower cost of capital through tax-exempt donations and bonds.
Medicaid and Medicare prices for nursing home care do not depend on quality of care, but Medicare and Medicaid recipients may still choose nursing homes on the basis of quality.
Clearly, certain aspects of quality are observable to patients and their families, while other aspects are unobservable, even with public report cards and regulatory oversight. Given that nonprofit and government providers lack a defined shareholder, these firms may have less incentive to maximize profits and a greater incentive to maximize other objectives such as unobservable aspects of quality and the provision of public goods (Hansmann 1980; Newhouse 1970 ).
Previous Literature
Nursing home ownership (for-profit vs. nonprofit) has received particular attention in the literature. In a comprehensive literature review of 38 studies published over the period 1990 through 2002, Hillmer and colleagues (2005) concluded that quality was lower in for-profit nursing homes. However, this previous literature is based almost entirely on cross-sectional comparisons of nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes that do not account for the possibility that there may be unobservable differences across residents receiving care at different types of facilities. Further, the literature on ownership and quality has focused on the long-stay population or on the nursing home population as a whole, with relatively little work differentiating short-stayers (post-acute) and long-stayers.
Two studies have used alternate methods to examine the role of nursing home ownership.
First, Grabowski and Stevenson (2008) exploited approximately 2,100 nursing home conversions that occurred between 1993 and 2004 to examine the effect of ownership on quality of care.
Given that conversions are usually preceded by financial difficulties (Sloan, Ostermann, and Conover 2003) , the study examined quality in the periods preceding conversion, and how it evolved in the periods following conversion. The results found little evidence to suggest a causal relationship between ownership conversions and nursing home performance. However, the study did find that facilities that have undergone conversion from nonprofit to for-profit status differ from those that did not undergo such a conversion. That is, facilities that converted from nonprofit to for-profit status were generally declining performers, while facilities that converted from for-profit to nonprofit status were generally improving performers. Second, Grabowski and Hirth (2003) considered whether competitive spillovers from nonprofits lead to higher quality in for-profit nursing homes. Using instrumental variables to account for the potential endogeneity of nonprofit market share, the study found that an increase in nonprofit market share improved for-profit and overall nursing home quality. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that nonprofits serve as a quality signal for uninformed nursing home consumers. Department of Health and Human Services will make detailed ownership information submitted by facilities available to the public. Finally, several states such as New York have enacted rules to oversee (and potentially limit) for-profit nursing home entry.
Data and Empirical Strategy
Data
The study primarily relies upon two types of individual level data: the Minimum Data Set (MDS) for nursing home resident assessment and Medicare Claims and Enrollment records. We also obtained measure of Medicaid eligibility from the Medicaid Analytic Extract (MAX) data.
At the nursing home level, the primary source of data was the Online Survey, Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) system. We also included data at the zip-code level. Each of these sources is described briefly below.
The primary data source for this project is the national repository of MDS data. The MDS resident assessment instrument has nearly 400 data elements, including cognitive function, communication/hearing problems, physical functioning, continence, psychosocial well-being, mood state, activity and recreation, disease diagnoses, health conditions, nutritional status, oral/dental status, skin conditions, special treatments, and medication use. Repeated evaluations of the reliability of the MDS provided at least adequate values on most scales (Mor et al. 2003; Mor et al. 2011; Morris et al. 1990; Phillips et al. 1997 ).
We merged the Medicare Standard Analytic File (inpatient and SNF files) and eligibility data from the Medicare enrollment record with MDS data using the Health Insurance Claim (HIC) number of Medicare beneficiaries. Match rates between MDS records of residents 65 and older exceed 95%. The Medicare enrollment file contains gender, date of birth, survival status, managed care participation, and Part A and B eligibility and "buy in" status. The record is updated at the end of the calendar year meaning that any change in managed care participation is identified. We also merged in Medicaid eligibility information from the MAX data.
The OSCAR database provides nursing-home level information on topics ranging from ownership and size to staffing and resident mix. The OSCAR data also include results from survey inspections and can be linked to the MDS data through the facility provider number available on the MDS-match rates now approach 100%. Completed on the day of the inspection, data include nursing home ownership, structure (e.g. size, number of beds) and staffing level information (by job category), observed deficiencies, and the availability of various services. A profile of residents in the nursing home on the day of the inspection is provided which includes information on number of residents (by payer category), functional deficits, nursing care needs, and receipt of "high tech" nursing care.
A key issue in the construction of our differential distance instrument (described in detail below) is the geo-coding of both nursing homes and nursing home resident's prior zip code of residence. We geo-coded all certified nursing homes that currently operate in the U.S. Using this geo-referenced database, we calculated the distance from a particular nursing home to a particular resident's prior residence as approximated by the centroid of the zip code area from which the resident was admitted. 1 We obtained zip code level information from the Census 2000 aggregates and merged these data to individuals in our sample based on their prior zip of residence. Specifically, we included a measure of per capita income and a measure of the percent of elderly individuals living below the federal poverty level.
Estimation Sample
Using national MDS data, a cohort of residents who were newly admitted to nursing homes within an 18-month period spanning January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2005 were identified.
Because of the fundamental interest in whether individuals choose a nonprofit or a for-profit 1 We examined the reliability and consistency of the resident's prior primary residence zip code information as reported on the admission MDS assessment as compared to the zip code data contained in the Medicare enrollment file for the same person. Specifically, we first identified all new nursing home admissions in 2000 and further determined their long-stay vs. short-stay status. Next, we matched these individuals to their enrollment records covering a three-year period: 1999, 2000, and 2001. Then we compared the resident's 1999 enrollment zip code (before ever entering a nursing home) with his/her prior residence zip code according to the 2000 admission MDS, separately for short-stay and long-stay residents. As expected, those short-stay residents were more likely than longstayers to have common zip codes across the two data sources (83% vs. 71%), presumably because most of the short-stayers return to their prior-admission residence within a short period of time. This reasonably high level of congruence indicates the reliability of the prior residence zip code information as reported in the MDS. We also assessed the stability of the resident's enrollment zip codes one year before and one year after the year of nursing home admission, separately for short-stay and long-stay residents. Similarly, the results show much greater stability for short-stayers who presumably return home than for long-stayers. For example, 84% of short-stayers reported the same enrollment zip in 1999 and 2001, compared to just 65% of long-stayers. The low stability in reported enrollment zip codes for long-stayers indicates that as one becomes a long-stay resident following admission, he or she will eventually have to change residence permanently. facility contingent upon the geographic proximity of selection options, it is important to identify individuals who have not previously made the choice in the past, which is the rationale for analyzing an "inception" cohort of new admissions. New admission status was determined by tracking all available MDS records for each individual back to 1999 to make sure that no prior nursing home entry has been indicated for that individual.
Empirical Specification
The standard empirical approach to examining the effect of nonprofit ownership on the provision of nursing home quality has been to estimate a reduced form equation that includes a dummy variable measuring ownership type. The basic specification for this approach is:
where Y refers to the quality measure, NFP is a dummy variable for nonprofit ownership status, X includes an intercept and a set of exogenous controls, and ε is the residual. The primary variable of interest in this study is a dummy variable coded as 1 for nonprofit ownership and 0 for nonprofit ownership. Importantly, when the OSCAR has been compared against other administrative data sources, organizational characteristics such as ownership type have shown strong validity (Straker 1999) . A relatively small percentage of facilities (6%) are governmentowned. Some of these facilities serve particular populations (e.g., Veterans Affairs beneficiaries) and others serve as safety net providers (e.g., many city or county facilities). Therefore, for many prospective residents, government facilities may not be close substitutes for private facilities. In our primary analyses, we exclude government-owned facilities and their residents, but we present a sensitivity analysis that includes these facilities.
In this study, quality Y is represented by several measures specific to the short-stay patient population. The short-stay quality measures are ADL improvement, mobility status, pain status, and the 30-day re-hospitalization rate. Across the measures, the possibility of informative censoring due to death or loss to follow-up exists (e.g., the resident left the initial nursing home for another; this is relatively rare, but still occurs). If we ignored this censoring, it could introduce bias into the measurement of the outcomes. To account for this, we estimate multinomial models that incorporate censoring. Thus, we model pain, mobility, and ADL functioning based on four outcomes: improvement, worsening, missing, and death. For the hospitalization measure, we model three 30-day outcomes: hospitalization, death, and neither hospitalization nor death.
A series of exogenous variables at the person, facility, zip code and state level were included as controls in this study. In particular, at the person level, we control for age, gender, race, education, marital status, Medicaid eligibility, diabetes, congestive heart failure, hip fracture, Alzheimer's, other dementia, stroke, manic depression, schizophrenia, emphysema/COPD, cancer, shortness of breath, number of medications in prior 7 days, and a cognitive performance scale (CPS). At the facility level, we controlled for the occupancy rate, the number of beds, urban/rural status, hospital-based facility and chain membership. At the zipcode level, we controlled for per capita income and the elderly poverty rate. We also controlled for state fixed effects.
We first estimate equation 1 using a least squares model. However, a key limitation is that this approach fails to account for unobserved selection into nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes. This omission may bias the coefficient on the categorical ownership variable and lead to misleading policy implications. As such, we next estimate an instrumental variables least squares estimator. Assume that nonprofit status NFP has the following reduced form:
where DD is the differential distance between the nearest nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes, X is the same set of variables that appeared in the quality equation, and  is the residual.
A key econometric issue is that nonprofit status NFP may be correlated with the error term in the quality equation. That is, unobservable factors may influence both the demand for quality and nonprofit nursing home care (Sloan 2000) . If this is the case, the error terms ε and  will be correlated, which violates the assumptions underlying the linear regression model.
However, we can still generate a consistent estimate of the effect of nonprofit status on quality if
we can identify a variable DD that is correlated with nonprofit status but not ε, the error term in the quality equation. Given DD, we can calculate an IV estimate of the effect of nonprofit status on quality.
We assume that differential distance between the nearest nonprofit and for-profit will strongly predict entry into a nonprofit nursing home. A large health services literature establishes the importance of distance in the choice of provider (e.g., Brooks et al. 2006; Hirth et al. 2003; McClellan, McNeil, and Newhouse 1994) and research also suggests that distance matters in the choice of nursing home (e.g., Shugarman, and Brown 2006; Zwanziger, Mukamel, and Indridason 2002) .
2
We also expect differential distance to be uncorrelated with unobserved factors that may influence outcomes. The wide and historical variability of nonprofit prevalence geographically helps make this a plausible assumption. That is, the relative proportion of nonprofits and for-profits in nursing homes has been relatively static within-markets over time (Grabowski and Stevenson, 2008) . The relative share of nonprofits in different parts of the country is rooted in historical factors such as the age of the city and different patterns of voluntarism and charitable provision that have little to do with the advanced technology and prevalence of third party payment that characterize the current health care environment (Stevens 1989 ). The conversions across for-profit and nonprofit ownership (roughly 75 in each direction per year) and the limited entry and exit over time do not create major changes in the presence of the ownership types in the majority of local markets. As such, we hypothesize that the differential distance measure is predetermined for potential nursing home residents and unrelated to the quality of care.
3
To construct a differential distance (DD) measure for nursing home residents, we calculated the distance using the great circle formula from the centroid of the resident's zip code prior to nursing home admission, as reported in the MDS admission assessment, to the exact geoaddress of the nearest nonprofit and for-profit facilities based on the latitude and longitude of the respective facilities. The differential measure was then calculated as the distance to the nearest nonprofit minus the distance to the nearest for-profit. In other words, the measure's interpretation is how much farther the resident would have to re-locate to be admitted to the nearest nonprofit facility. A negative value on this measure indicates that the nearest facility is a nonprofit.
In the estimation of our IV models, we account for the fact that both our endogenous regressor (ownership status) and our outcomes of interest (e.g., hospitalization) are binary measures. Recent methodological papers have stressed the potential for bias in this "binary/binary" case when standard two-stage least squares IV methods are employed (e.g., Bhattacharya, Goldman, and McCaffrey 2006; Terza, Bradford, and Dismuke 2008) . Even in cases such as ours with large sample size, this bias is not attenuated. Assuming a valid instrument, the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method has been shown to provide unbiased estimates in the binary/binary case (Terza, Basu, and Rathouz 2008) . A number of examples are found in the health economics and health services literature of the application of this method in the context of the binary/binary case. For example, 2SRI methods were recently applied in a study of the effects of endogenous prescription drug coverage (yes/no) on any prescription drug use (yes/no) (Shea et al. 2007 ).
In our application, we estimate the first stage using least squares and the second stage using a multinomial logit. In the results section, we present marginal effects for the key outcomes. The full multinomial results are available upon request.
In grouped data such as the MDS, a concern involves the likely presence of heteroskedasticity. When the true specification of the residual variance-covariance matrix follows such a structure, Moulton (1990) has shown that estimates of the standard errors will be biased downwards. A straightforward and unrestrictive approach to addressing this issue is to adjust the standard errors using the Huber-White robust estimator clustered at the zip-code level. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the variables used in our analysis. Roughly 40% of the postacute patients are admitted to nonprofit facilities. The average age is 81 years old, roughly twothirds are female, 89% are white, 35% are married, and 20% of the sample is Medicaid-eligible.
In terms of outcomes, 18.2% of the sample is hospitalized within 30 days and 5.2% dies (without hospitalization). Improvement in ADL functioning (34.1%), pain status (7.3%), and mobility (29.5%) all occurred to varying degrees, although we observed significant missing outcomes and loss to follow-up with all three measures. The average differential distance was 3.67 kilometers, suggesting the typical patient had to travel 3.67 additional kilometers to the nearest nonprofit facility relative to the nearest for-profit.
Effect of Differential Distance: Specification Tests
Problems with weak instruments are well-known (Staiger, and Stock 1997; Stock, and Yogo 2005) and Bound and colleagues (1995) have argued that the use of instruments that jointly explain little variation in the endogenous regressors can do more harm than good. The differential distance instrument meets the standard of Staiger and Stock, with the F-statistics far exceeding the threshold of 10 (see Table 3 ). These first-stage estimates suggest that a one kilometer increase in the differential distance between the nearest nonprofit and for-profit led to a 0.6 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of choosing a nonprofit.
In addition to the assumption regarding the instruments being strongly associated with the endogenous variable, IV also assumes the instrument must not be correlated with the error term in the second stage of IV estimation. If it is still correlated, then the instrumented variable will still be endogenous. Although it is impossible to confirm the null hypothesis that the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term in the quality equation, a standard practice within the literature is to report whether the instrument is correlated with those observed factors that affect the second-stage error term. Thus, we divide the variables used within this study by those observations that are above or below the median in differential distance (see Table 4 ). As 
Results
Primary Findings
The estimates of the effect of profit status on quality of care are presented in Table 5 . In the table, we present both the standard model that treats profit status as exogenous, and the IV model that treats profit status as endogenous. For the majority of outcomes, the results are quite different across the two models.
In the least squares model, short-stay patients in nonprofit facilities are 2.1% less likely to be hospitalized within 30 days. Improvement in mobility was 1.3% lower in nonprofit facilities, while improvement in ADL functioning was 1.83% lower. The least squares approach did not suggest a statistically meaningful difference in the improvement of pain by ownership status.
Thus, when we fail to account for the endogeneity of ownership status, our results suggest a very mixed story with patients in nonprofits faring worse in terms of hospitalizations but better in terms of mobility and ADL improvement.
When we account for endogenous ownership in the IV models, we obtain a much more consistent story regarding ownership and short-stay quality. Specifically, patients admitted to nonprofit facilities are 1.76% less likely to be re-admitted to the hospital within 30-days. They are also 0.81% less likely to experience improvement in pain status, and 2.62% less likely to experience improvement in ADL functioning. We did not obtain a statistically meaningful effect of ownership on mobility improvement. As a percentage of the dependent variable mean, admission to a nonprofit is associated with between 8% and 11% better quality relative to admission to a for-profit. Thus, unlike the least squares model, a remarkably consistent picture of the relationship between ownership and short-stay quality emerges when we instrument for endogenous ownership.
Specification Checks
In order to examine the robustness of our primary model specification, we ran a series of alternate models (see Table 6 ). As a first check, we excluded those discharges to hospital-based nursing homes from our dataset. The concern is that hospital-based nursing homes might selectively attract patients from the hospital to which they are affiliated (Stearns et al. 2006 ).
When we re-ran the model excluding the hospital-based discharges, the 30-day hospitalization f result was robust, but the pain and ADL functioning estimates were smaller and no longer statistically meaningful.
Another potential concern is that the exclusion of discharges to government nursing homes may have biased the results. When we added discharges to government facilities and included a corresponding instrument for differential distance to a government provider relative to the next nearest facility, the nonprofit results were relatively robust across all the outcomes.
Another potential concern is that the result might be predominantly concentrated in either urban or rural areas. The hospitalization effect was strong in both urban and rural markets. Given the loss in precision due to smaller sample sizes, the pain and ADL functioning results were not statistically meaningful but both were stronger in urban markets.
The primary model results include state fixed effects. When we substituted county fixed effects for state fixed effects, the 30-day hospitalization and ADL functioning results both suggested higher quality in nonprofit nursing homes. We also experimented with different forms of the DD instrument including a binary measure (above/below median) and logged values to take account of skewed values. The results were relatively robust for the hospitalization outcome but less so for the other outcomes. Finally, because we approximated the resident's prior residence by the centroid of the zip code area from which the resident was admitted, the DD instrument will have the greatest measurement error when the resident enters a nursing home in that same zip code. When we exclude those cases where a resident enters a nursing home in their zip code of prior residence, the hospitalization and pain results are relatively robust to our baseline estimates.
In summary, the specification checks suggest the hospitalization results are fairly robust across all the various checks. The pain and ADL improvement results are less robust, but in several cases, the point estimates are relatively similar but the smaller sample caused a loss in precision.
Conclusion
A large health economics literature has investigated the relationship between ownership status and quality of care. The majority of these studies treat ownership as exogenous, although there are reasons to suspect that firms jointly choose their ownership form and quality of care (Sloan 2000) . This study suggests that-after instrumenting for endogenous ownershipnonprofits provide better quality for short-stay patients relative to their for-profit counterparts.
Unlike the least squares (uninstrumented) models, this result is consistent across distinct measures of short-stay quality. Therefore, failure to account for the endogeneity of ownership would lead to an errant conclusion that ownership does not have a systematic relationship to quality of care, which could lead to unjustified policy prescriptions.
From a policy perspective, the relationship between ownership status and quality is fundamentally important towards establishing whether nonprofit nursing homes are indeed engaging in socially beneficial activities that justify their tax-exempt status. With the aging of the baby boom generation, quality of nursing home care will continue to be an important policy concern in the coming decades. Salkever and Frank (1992) identified three factors that have heightened the interest of policymakers, legislators and courts in the role of nonprofit firms within the health care sector. First, the United States has seen a greater privatization of health services with the shrinking of public sector providers and the shifting of patients to nonprofit providers. Second, we have seen a steady growth in private and public third-party financing over the past few decades. As nonpaying patients became paying patients, the charitable role of nonprofits and the importance of philanthropy as a revenue source may have eroded. And finally, the recent appearance of more vigorous competition and cost containment pressures have drawn into question whether the cross-subsidization of "good works" that nonprofits were presumed to practice should in fact be continued. If nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes converge in behavior due to these competitive pressures, the tax-exempt status afforded nonprofit facilities may no longer be justified. In addition, the "corporatization" of health services has become increasingly controversial (e.g., recent Congressional nursing home hearings on acquisitions of large nursing home chains by private equity groups). Thus, determining the benefits of nonprofit ownership in today's marketplace is useful to policy-makers.
Weisbrod (1988) has outlined two goals for public policy towards the nonprofit sector:
(1) public policy should help encourage nonprofits to achieve their social goals, and (2) public policy should help achieve a better balance of institutional responsibilities between nonprofit,
for-profit and government-controlled nursing homes (Santerre, and Vernon 2007) . Given that our results suggest that nonprofits raise the level of quality available to residents (ceteris paribus), the government may wish to increase (or at least maintain) the preferential tax treatment provided nonprofits. Moreover, the government might give nonprofit owners preferential treatment in the certificate-of-need (CON) application process, particularly in areas with relatively few nonprofits. In many states, CON is still used to restrict entry by new nursing home owners. Similarly, oversight of facility/chain sales to nonprofit owners might be treated differently relative to sales to for-profit owners. For example, New York State currently has provisions preventing ownership by a for-profit firm based outside the state. Partly due to this law, 42% of the facilities in New York State are nonprofit, as compared to 27% nationally.
The implications above are largely "proscriptive" with respect to policy towards nonprofits. However, there are also implications with respect to care planning for residents.
First and foremost, better estimates of the causal effect of ownership on quality can aide prospective residents and their public and private advocates in making better care decisions. For example, the ownership status of facilities is currently reported on Nursing Home Compare (www.medicare.gov/NHCompare), the government's nursing home report card effort. In addition to the quality measures reported on the website (e.g., survey deficiencies, staffing, pressure ulcers), the results of this study provide salience to ownership status as a signal of quality. Second, an improved understanding of the effects of ownership also contributes to the assessment of an area's long-term care resources, even if direct policy measures to change the environment cannot be implemented quickly.
From a methodological perspective, this study also provides long-term care researchers with a potential new approach to analyzing for-profit and nonprofit differences which accounts for unobserved patient differences across ownership types, and which could also be applied to study the impact of other facility characteristics such as chain ownership. The theoretical model developed by Hirth (1999) suggests that such benefits of nonprofit ownership could include both a direct effect (nonprofits may deliver higher quality on average) and an indirect, or spillover, effect in which all types of facilities perform better in markets with a significant nonprofit presence. Unlike most existing studies that are based solely on the differences between facilities of different ownership types, our IV analysis captures the total benefits arising from both of these sources. Essentially, differential distance to the nearest nonprofit provides an index to "exposure" to nonprofit care, whether that exposure arises directly (being more likely to receive care from a nonprofit) or indirectly (residing in an area where nonprofits are relatively prevalent). Similarly, the IV strategy is able to overcome the selection bias problem which potentially confounds the findings of many prior studies, and provides information on the implications of ownership for the increasingly important short-stay population that has received far less attention than the "traditional" long-stay nursing home population. 
